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Abstract 
This commentary responds to Henry Wai-chung Yeung’s call to develop clearer causal 
explanations in geography through mechanism-based thinking. His suggested use of a critical 
realist framework to ground geographical research on economies is, on one level, appealing and 
may help to counteract taken-for-granted assumptions about socio-spatial conditions and the 
significance of economic structures for everyday lived experiences. However, the general lack of 
applied critical realist research means the distinction between “mechanism” and “process” is often 
difficult to define in analyses of specific empirical events or geographical episodes. Not only is 
there a need for methodological development but, I suggest, also for greater recognition of critical 
realism as a reflective practice. We need to consider the means by which scholars distinguish 
between contingent and necessary relations, identify structures and counterfactuals, and infer how 
mechanisms work out in particular places. The critical realist goal of advancing transformative 
change through the provision of causal explanation relies upon inferences made on the basis of 
researcher experience. Hence, we need to recognise that research is always a political practice and 
be careful not to discount knowledge borne from other analytical approaches. 
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Mechanism, process and the wider context of economic geography 
 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in defining economic geography’s core 
intellectual project and contribution to the social sciences. Mainly in response to the Economic 
Geography Research Group of the RGS-IGB report tracking the movement of Economic 
Geographers into Business and Management Schools in the UK (see James et al., 2018), 
geographers undertaking research on economies have reflected on the framing of the subdiscipline 
and its theoretical and methodological practices (Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 
2018: 1496-1545; also Gibson, 2019). In turn, Henry Wai-chung Yeung’s (2019) article speaks to 
economic and political geographers and argues for a (re)turn to the ‘intense theorization of 
causality and mechanisms in critical realism’ as a means of ‘advancing the explanatory goals of 
geographical analysis’ (p?) which he suggests have been weakened by ‘thick description of socio-
spatial processes’ (p.?). It then claims, in ambitious terms, the applicability of a critical realist 
approach to geographical scholarship more generally. 
 Yeung’s contention is that geographical comprehension of ‘patterns of uneven 
development both within and across countries that are critical to understanding contemporary 
economic and political debates’ (p.?) are limited by an ongoing failure to differentiate between 
“process” and “mechanism” in causal explanations. Process, he suggests, should reference changes 
that proceed through contingent events, while mechanism should denote the components that 
generate those events (the constituent parts of process). The explanatory nature of geography must 
avoid the conflation of mechanism and process as this reduces its radical edge. A critical realist 
method, his article suggests, helps facilitate an analysis of complex and contradictory phenomena. 
It does not simply posit that A causes B but develops a critique of socio-spatial change and related 
lived experiences that helps point to the most decisive areas of conflict and spheres of action (see 
also Joseph, 1998). Hence, its radicality lies in it focusing on mechanisms and processes and not 
subscribing to universal or trans-historical abstractions. Yeung illustrates his argument with 
reference to ideas of neoliberalism, developing and extending the critiques, not just of 
neoliberalism, but other process-based analyses that are seen to mitigate effective political 
engagement (cf. Ferguson, 2010; Weller and O’Neill, 2014; Venugopal, 2015). 
Yeung indicates that there are geographical studies where spatial relationships and practices 
are claimed on the basis of insufficient data, but his argument concerns more than the 
overinterpretation of empirical research findings. It is a call for more tightly defined theories of 
neoliberalism, path dependence and analogous geographical processes. In short, it asks how we as 
geographers can produce more than just stylised facts. How can we bring new knowledge that is 
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appreciative of the human and physical characteristics of places and environments and ensure that 
this knowledge is not applied insensitively to context? Moreover, how can we guard against the 
use of “chaotic” or “fuzzy” concepts that obscure ‘the possibility of and responsibility for socio-
spatial change’ (p. ?) by simplifying phenomena in such a way that the capacity of individuals to 
constrain or enable the component mechanisms of a process in action is no longer evident (see 
also Markusen, 1999)? 
Critical realism – given its appreciation of enduring structures and mechanisms that 
generate phenomena (Bhaskar, 2008) – is proposed as a means by which geographers can uncover 
the features of contexts that set different mechanisms in motion so as to produce particular 
outcomes. I do not disagree with the expressed need to counter universalising rhetoric, which has 
led some scholars to question the reality of concepts like neoliberalism, nor the utility of a 
framework that focuses attention upon the complex interplay of context and mechanisms. But I 
note that the heterogeneity and complexity of the social world requires a degree of synthesis to 
pull together knowledge about spatial patterns and relationships, and caution that we ought not 
forget the importance of positionality for interpreting the shifting nature of economic and political 
world (see also MacLeavy, 2014). Not only is research a social process whereby geographers – 
sometimes unknowingly – respond to experience, but any attempt to bring cause back into 
geographical analysis via critical realism implies that objectivity is possible  thereby undermining 
at least implicitly work on the social, cultural, racialised and gendered dimensions aspects of 
economic and political issues (see also Cockayne et al, 2018).  
In what follows I focus on what is claimed to permit deeper levels of explanation in 
geography, namely the separation of mechanism from process. I consider the extent to which the 
critical realist framework to establish causation can help us to identify what is specific and what is 
general in theorisations of neoliberalism, drawing upon recent co-authored work on Brexit to 
illustrate the difficulty in mobilising this framework in “open” environments where there is 
capacity for change (Sayer, 1992). At its root, the problem is that ‘mechanisms are not regularities 
but are potentially causal generative processes that operate in particular historical, local, or 
institutional contexts’ (Jones, 2010: 203). Demarcating one from the other therefore raises 
questions around the duration and geographical scope of study; that is, how to create the 
conditions of a “closed” system in an empirical research enquiry. To elucidate explanatory 
mechanisms and structures, a critical realist analysis needs to ensure there is no change in the 
intrinsic enabling conditions and also that the relationship between the causal mechanism and the 
external world remains constant (confirming the regularity of what Bhaskar (2008) terms the 
  4 
extrinsic condition). Given the dynamism of the social world, we need to be realistic about what 
can be achieved in this respect. 
Let me illustrate this assessment with reference to a recent article on the UK referendum 
on EU membership in which my co-authors and I engaged with the way in which ‘electoral processes 
produce division’ (Bromley-Davenport et al, 2019: 808; emphasis added). In this, we sought to 
identify and make sense of the uneven geographies of leave and remain voting using qualitative 
data detailing the different ways in which people had given meaning to their votes at a time when 
the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU were unknown. We were concerned that the 
presumption of two diametrically opposed groups in British politics (leavers and remainers) was 
obscuring the messy and contradictory ways in which votes were cast. Moreover, the caricatured 
view of the electorate was militating against the establishment of a political movement that not 
only identified a level of dissatisfaction with the political status quo but recognised and sought to 
respond to it. Our process-based conception of referendum identified the complexity of voting 
patterns and behaviours. Yet a critical realist scholar such as Yeung might contend that the 
concrete mechanisms constitutive of the process through which members of the public aligned 
themselves with those either for or against EU membership were underspecified. The causal claims 
to which we alluded (with regards to the role of economic stagnation, marginalisation and mistrust 
in engendering support for the Leave campaign) did not make explicit how disaffection with 
politics is operationalised through specific mechanisms that connect macro-level changes (e.g. 
deindustrialisation, the demise of the unions, the emergence of the professional politician) with 
particular sets of outcomes in UK economy and society (e.g. left behind places, disenfranchised 
groups). 
Revisiting our research in light of Yeung’s critique, it seems necessary to bring questions 
of causality to the fore. So, what are the explanatory determinants and forces of difference and division 
in the UK referendum on EU membership? Can an extended period of economic and political 
change serve as the cause of the pattern of votes that was observed, or is it necessary to distil this 
rather general idea down to a series of antecedent events or necessary conditions? The critical 
realist framework suggests that we can distinguish causal factors through intensive research, but 
whether the Brexit vote should be conceived as a mechanism for socio-spatial change (something 
that occurs as a result of voters being presented with a ballot paper) or a process (in which the 
choice to vote leave or remain is contingent upon the sequential series of events and actions by 
individuals and broader collectives in and beyond the UK) is dependent upon the conditions we 
use to establish a closed system; that is, what temporal and spatial parameters we use to determine 
our theoretical formulations. Yeung’s article recognises this. As he states, ‘a mechanism can be a 
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particular kind of process’ (p.?) such that it appears not so much the definition of a mechanism 
vis-a-vis a process that is important, but the type and style of theorising that a turn to mechanism-
based thinking encourages (see also Hedström and Swedberg, 1996). 
With mechanism and process so heavily intertwined, the blueprint for ‘revitalising 
explanation as a central purpose of geographical analysis’ (p?) requires theoretically self-conscious 
and reflective empirical practice. I commend Yeung’s attempt to effectively mobilise this 
conceptual apparatus but also wonder about the extent to which scholars can or need to bring out 
singular mechanisms. Though Yeung’s article provides a worked example of how the 
mechanism/process distinction might work in the investigation of neoliberalism in China, his 
suggestion that the Communist Party serves as the causal mechanism of economic transformation 
in the country is curious. An alternative reading might suggest that party politics is “context” as 
the political domination of China’s state is unique to this geographical setting. The one-party state 
creates the ideal conditions for triggering the mechanism in question: it is not the mechanism per 
se. Without wishing to deny the value in identifying ‘the features of contexts that allow different 
mechanisms to be activated so as to generate particular outcomes’ (Jones, 2010: 209), the difficulty 
in distinguishing context from mechanism, as well as mechanism from process, demonstrates the 
want for more concrete and detailed examples of applied research using critical realism as a 
philosophical and methodological framework (Fletcher, 2016). 
Context is an umbrella term in terms of both scale (ranging from the global to the body) 
and temporal aspects. While Yeung acknowledges the ‘specification of mechanisms and their 
concrete contexts of operating efficacy matters much’ (p.?), the geographical limits that pertain to 
particular mechanisms – and how to identify them – lie beyond the scope of his article. Elsewhere, 
however, proponents of critical realism have engaged with the contingent properties of space and 
time and whether it is possible to construct universal and abstract theory whilst also acknowledging 
the particular elements of a phenomenon that ‘vary hugely across space generating all manner of 
juxtapositions’ (Cox, 2013: 54). More broadly, the concern to ‘demarcate general process from 
local realizations, whilst also enabling the former to be augmented by the latter’ is long-standing 
(Barnett, 1999: 280). It is twenty years since Clive Barnett questioned the role of context in human 
geography, asking whether understandings of borders and limits are taken for granted in theory 
and practice. Yeung (2003) subsequently reflected upon the methodological challenges presented 
by the contingent property of context and – contra to Barnett’s (1999: 289) call for ‘liberation from 
the normalising rules that usually govern context’ – underlined the importance of appreciating the 
relevant broader settings of subjects/objects under empirical investigation. 
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There is, then, a history to Yeung’s call to move from “surface” illustrations of some 
observed phenomena (neoliberalism, path dependence) and investigate in specific operating 
contexts the underlying mechanisms that have shaped the emergent powers or potentialities giving 
rise to that phenomena. Given this, one might detect an effort to stem certain types of scholarship 
that fail to take contextualised causal explanation seriously. Critical realism offers a radical 
alternative to positivism (where the goal is generalisable laws), interpretism (which seeks only to 
understand and interpret human behaviour) and postmodernism (which denies the existence of a 
universal stable reality) (Jones, 2010). I would contend that Yeung is troubled by the drift from 
cause (i.e. how to understand cause and effect) towards “difference” in geographical research on 
economies and is stating how he wishes to see the subdiscipline of ‘“proper noun” economic 
geography’ develop (Cockayne et al., 2018: 1511).1 It would be unfair to suggest he is alone in 
staking a claim, but important to recognise the extent to which the article might be signalling a 
struggle over not just concepts but a broader geographical approach or project in view of the fact 
that the figureheads are for particular kinds of theory (critical realism in this instance) are 
increasingly located outside of geography departments, whether in business and management 
schools, the allied social sciences or within the realms of university management (James et al., 
2018). 
It might also be valuable to reflect upon the degree to which the drawing out of a particular 
concept (that is, mechanism) allows a claiming of authority given that the need for a more 
sophisticated theoretical articulation of the relationship between mechanism and process is not as 
clear cut as Yeung suggests. In short, and to return to the Brexit example briefly, do words matter 
if we need to understand why there was a small majority voted to leave the EU and the implications 
of this? They may matter if the goal of research is to write simple and citable theory, but less so if 
the ambition is to remove ignorance and false views, or to help improve economic fortunes as an 
extension of understanding uneven development and social inequality. Economic geography is 
often framed as an emancipatory social science (owing to its activist tradition and the manner in 
which this has been used to differentiate economic geography from economics). A framework of 
mechanism and process may help to raise and examine conventional ideas through measurement 
and causal modelling, but broadly defined geographies of economies informed by feminist, anti-
racist, postcolonial and queer perspectives (which in many respects challenge orthodox critical 
realist views) also have a valuable role in illuminating the inherently spatial aspects of contemporary 
 
1 Not only does he start his article with a review of the debate in Environment and Planning A: Economy and 
Space over the future of UK economic geography, but his earlier (2003) methodological examination is directed 
towards practitioners of new economic geographies as opposed to what Cockayne et al (2018: 1512) term 
‘economic geography proper’. 
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inequality and injustice. Elsewhere scholars have argued for a continued collective interest in 
economic phenomena, whereby “things economic” are explored by scholars within and outwith 
economic geography proper (Cockayne et al., 2018). Critical realism can play a part in this by 
setting out an ordering framework for quantitative researchers to describe the statistical 
relationships within their data, and a theory of causation for qualitative research that takes account 
of the character of empirical findings (Crankshaw, 2014). Yet the questions posed and the 
problems that geographers seek collectively to address must be shaped by a diverse set of ideas 
and practices if they are to advance an emancipatory political agenda (Blomley, 2006).  
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